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Abstract
Over the past several decades, the financial markets have experienced a
technological revolution in how securities and other financial instruments are
traded. Where these contracts and assets were once traded on the floors of various
registered brick and mortar exchanges across the globe, they are now primarily
traded via online platforms. While allowing greater efficiency and transparency in
the markets, this shift has also spawned the practice of high-frequency algorithmic
trading. This process uses highly sophisticated computers and complex algorithms
to trade securities and derivative products faster than the human eye can blink.
Although many argue that high-frequency algorithmic trading accounts for a great
deal of liquidity in our markets and creates transparency with regard to prices,
many feel that the nature of the practice creates the potential for extreme
instability in the markets as well. Such instability has been exhibited periodically
through occurrences known as “flash crashes.” In response to these events, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has drafted legislation, known as
Regulation Automated Trading, aimed at controlling the extent to which
algorithmic trading can disrupt the marketplace. However, several of the
provisions have come under a great deal of scrutiny. In particular, one provision
provides that those engaging in high-frequency algorithmic trading make their
source code (the algorithmic code which drives their business) available to
regulatory agencies at any time. This Article analyzes the costs and benefits of
high-frequency algorithmic trading, and how Regulation Automated Trading
oversteps its bounds in trying to regulate the industry.
I. Introduction
The American financial markets on May 6, 2010 opened with a slightly
elevated sense of volatility.1 In response to a flurry of concerning problems
* Juris Doctor, 2016, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. in History, 2013, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana.
1. See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523,
523 (2014) (noting that American stock markets opened on May 6, 2010 in less than stable conditions given
the status of Greek debt hanging in the balance); see also Jill Treanor, The 2010 “Flash Crash”: How It
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occurring in Greece the previous day, including “violent protests . . . against
proposed austerity measures designed to avert a default on Greek government
debt[,]” it is no wonder that investor sentiment was down.2 From the opening bell
until approximately 2:32 p.m., prices on all markets saw a general decline, with
indexes associated with the stock market experiencing losses of approximately
three percent.3 From 2:32 to 2:41 p.m., the market decline began to accelerate. 4
“Then, at 2:41 p.m., the markets went careening entirely off the rails. In less time
than it takes to soft-boil an egg, the markets took a sickening plunge of more than
[five percent], so that by 2:45 p.m. markets were down nearly [ten percent] for the
day.”5 From 2:45 until approximately 3:00 p.m., while the market as a whole began
to rapidly recover, certain individual securities and exchange-traded funds saw
extreme price fluctuations, where trading on some blue chip securities was
conducted for as little as one penny and as much as $100,000 a share. 6 After 3:00
p.m., trading on most securities and indexes returned to their normal level, 7
leaving many to pose the question: “What just happened?”
Several years later, on August 24, 2015, the markets experienced a similar
inexplicable short-term swing.8 Even before the opening bell on this day, most
securities and futures products had sustained declines in the broader market. 9
However, as the opening minutes went by, many exchange-traded funds began to
be traded at significantly less value than their underlying assets indicated. 10 With
“more than [twenty percent] of S&P 500 companies and more than [forty percent]
of NASDAQ-100 companies reach[ing] daily lows that were [ten percent] or more
below their previous day’s closing price[,]” it became clear that market events such
as those of May 6, 2010 were not one-time, isolated incidents.11 In fact, these not
uncommon instances, known as “flash crashes,” have become a major cause for
concern in the U.S. securities and derivatives markets over the past several years.
Although these “flash crashes” are the result of a variety of market variables,
many believe that their occurrence is primarily the result of high-frequency
algorithmic trading. This practice utilizes sophisticated computer algorithms to

Unfolded, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 1:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/22/ 2010-

flash-crash-new-york-stock-exchange-unfolded (analyzing how despite some financial uncertainty at the start
of the day, the events of May 6, 2010 were entirely unexpected).
2. Korsmo, supra note 1.
3. See Staffs of the CFTC & SEC, Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010 9 (Sept. 30,
2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/staff-findings050610.pdf
[hereinafter September CFTC-SEC Findings Report] (breaking down the market events of May 6, 2010, into
several stages).
4. See id. (describing how in these nine short minutes, “the broad markets began to lose more ground,
declining another 1–2%”).
5. Korsmo, supra note 1, at 524.
6. See September CFTC-SEC Findings Report, supra note 3, at 9, 86 (discussing how Apple Inc. (AAPL)
was traded for as much as $100,000 per share at approximately 3:29 p.m.); see also Korsmo, supra note 1, at
525 (identifying that Apple Inc. normally traded for around $250 per share).
7. September CFTC-SEC Findings Report, supra note 3.
8. See generally Jonnelle Marte, SEC Report Sheds Light on the August Flash Crash, WASH. POST (Dec.
30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2015/12/30/sec-report-sheds-light-on-theaugust-flash-crash/ (recounting the sudden and dramatic market decline and rebound on August 24, 2015).
9. Staff of the SEC, Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015 9 (Dec. 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/equity_market_volatility.pdf [hereinafter Equity Market
Volatility on August 24, 2015].
10. Marte, supra note 8.
11. Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015, supra note 9, at 1.
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execute trades faster than the human eye can blink, with little to no human
deference.12
While many argue that high-frequency trading is beneficial to the overall
market structure, such as by contributing a substantial portion of liquidity, 13
“flash crashes” such as those which occurred on May 6, 2010 and August 24, 2015
make clear that the practice may be in need of tighter regulation.14 In response to
these concerns, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) recently
approved a comprehensive set of proposed rules regarding the practice of highfrequency automated trading.15 The rules, collectively known as Regulation
Automated Trading (“Reg. AT”), “represent a series of risk controls, transparency
measures, and other safeguards to enhance the U.S. regulatory regime for
automated trading.”16 Despite the rules’ good intentions, many industry experts
argue that the rules may be over-burdensome and unnecessary.17 One particular
provision that has received a great deal of negative attention is the provision
requiring AT persons (those whom the rules define as participating in algorithmic
trading) to open up their source code repositories to the CFTC and Department of
Justice without a subpoena.18
This Article aims to shed light on the source code repository provision and
analyze its potential costs and benefits to the market as a whole. Part II of this
Article will provide a brief background of the high-frequency trading industry and
motivations behind the CFTC’s development of Reg. AT. Part III will then look
closely at the source code turnover provision and analyze both the provision’s
benefits and pitfalls with regard to creating stability in the general market.
Finally, Part IV will propose a limitation on the source code turnover provision
better suited to current regulatory practices and more protective of this valuable
information. Part V will conclude.

12. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 527–28 (describing how high-frequency traders “use high-speed
computers to execute rapid-fire trades, usually without real-time human involvement, and have, in a matter
of only a few years, gone from non-existent to conducting perhaps a majority of all trades on public securities
markets”).
13. See Matthew O’Brien, Everything You Need to Know About High-Frequency Trading, ATLANTIC (Apr.
11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-highfrequency-trading/360411/ (identifying several benefits to the market of high-frequency trading, including
improving liquidity and reducing spreads and other price inefficiencies).
14. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 528 (discussing high-frequency trading’s tendency to increase market
volatility).
15. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Unanimously Approves Proposed Rule on Automated Trading (Nov. 24,
2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7283-15.
16. Id.
17. See Letter from Walter L. Lukken, President & CEO, Futures Indus. Ass’n, to Christopher
Kirkpatrick, Sec’y, CFTC, at 52 (Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter FIA Reg AT Comment Letter], available at
http://www.futuresmag.com/sites/default/files/FIA%20letter%20mar16.pdf (identifying several aspects of
Reg. AT that the Futures Industry Association disagrees with, mostly notably the source code repository).
18. See Regulation Automated Trading, at 510 (proposed Nov. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
1, 38, 40, & 170), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalregister112415.pdf
[hereinafter Regulation Automated Trading]; see also Gregory Meyer & Philip Stafford, US Regulators
Propose Powers to Scrutinize Algo Traders’ Source Code , FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1 2015, 10:45 a.m.),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/137f81bc-944f-11e5-b190-291e94b77c8f.html#axzz47pavqdzF (citing some of the
harsh opposition that the CFTC has received from HFT firms regarding the source code repository provision).
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II. Background
The U.S. derivatives markets have undergone a dramatic transformation
over the past twenty years. 19 Traditionally, derivatives were traded by humans
who communicated and placed orders to other humans on registered trading
floors.20 Such was predominantly the case up until the early 2000’s.21 As
technology began to rapidly advance the financial industry, trading conducted by
humans slowly became a thing of the past. In contrast to this human-centered
environment, today’s derivatives transactions are conducted on:
automated trading environments, [which] are characterized precisely by their high
degree of automation, and by the wide array of algorithmic and information
technology systems that generate, risk manage, transmit and match orders and
trades, as well as systems used to confirm transactions, communicate market data
and link related systems through high-speed communication networks.22

These complex electronic trading platforms have caused many participants in the
financial markets, from mutual funds to proprietary trading firms, to adopt the
use of alternative trading systems.23 These computer-driven systems
automatically match derivatives orders to multiple markets through the use of
sophisticated computer technology.24 Despite the efficiencies that these systems
have undoubtedly created, they have also allowed for the development and modern
dominance of high-frequency trading (“HFT”).25
According to the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee (“TAC”), HFT is
a type of trading characterized by (1) “algorithms for decision making, order
initiation, generation, routing, or execution, for each individual transaction
without human direction;” (2) “low-latency technology that is designed to minimize
response times, including proximity and co-location services;” (3) high speed
connections to markets for order entry;” and (4) “high message rates (orders,
19. See Concept Release on Risk Controls and Systems Safeguards For Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,542 (Sept. 12, 2013) (describing the “fundamental evolution” that has
revolutionized the futures markets, whereby “human-centered trading venues” have evolved with technology
to become “highly automated and interconnected trading environments” where computers play the central
role).
20. Id.
21. See Ambereen Choudhurry & Julia Verlaine, FX Traders Facing Extinction as Computers Replace
Humans, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-18/fx-traders-facingextinction-as-computers-replace-humans (citing statistics generated by consulting group Aite Group LLC,
indicating that electronic currency trading accounted for approximately twenty percent of currency
transactions in 2001, and as much as sixty-six percent in 2013); see also Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes,
Algorithms
Take
Control
of
Wall
Street,
WIRED
(Dec.
27,
2010,
12:00
p.m.),
http://www.wired.com/2010/12/ff_ai_flashtrading/ (discussing the rise in computerized trading and estimating
that as of 2010, computer-driven trading accounted for as much as seventy percent of total trade volume).
22. Concept Release on Risk Controls, supra note 19.
23. See Alternative Trading System – ATS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alterna
tive-trading-system.asp (defining an ATS as “a trading system that is not regulated as an exchange, but is a
venue for matching the buy and sell orders of its subscribers”); see also Jean Folger, The Pros and Cons of
Automated
Trading
Systems,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept.
11,
2014,
3:00
p.m.),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/11/automated-trading-systems.asp.
24. See Concept Release on Risk Controls, supra note 19, at 56,545 (describing an ATS as a “computerdriven system that automates the generation and routing of orders to one or more markets”).
25. See Gregory Scopino, The Questionable Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running in the
Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607, 619–20 (2015) (analyzing the technological advances that have led to
the rise of HFT, including most prominently the ability to use computers to read and act upon data received
from exchanges).
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quotes or cancellations).”26 This practice is typically conducted with the use of
automated trading systems (“ATS’s”).27 These ATS’s constitute a complex set of
computer instructions, or algorithms,28 designed to cause a computer to carry out
a wide array of trading strategies.29 Designated contract markets (“DCM’s”) 30 and
DCM market participants utilize these highly sophisticated ATS’s for the
“generation, transmission, management, and execution of orders, as well as . . . to
confirm transactions, communicate market data, and link markets and market
participants through high-speed networks.”31 Using these ATS’s, DCM’s are able
to “accept, manage and match orders by automated means.” 32
Today, DCM’s and ATS’s are involved with an overwhelmingly large
number of futures transactions, as the derivatives markets have made the shift to
predominantly electronic trading.33 Data published by the CFTC recently
indicated that as of October 2014, as much as ninety-five percent of futures trades
were conducted on some sort of electronic platform.34 More specifically, the CFTC
data indicates that in a two-year period ending in October 2014, ATS’s were
utilized by at least one side of a transaction in eighty percent of foreign exchange
futures volume, sixty-seven percent of interest rate futures volume, and sixty-two
percent of equity futures volume.35 Additionally, in its 2013 “Concept Release on
Risk Controls and Systems Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments,” the
CFTC indicated that “91.50% of exchange trading volume in U.S. futures markets
was executed electronically.”36 These figures demonstrate the extent to which
automated trading dominates the futures and derivatives markets; and given the
continuing advances in modern technology, there is no end of this dominance in
sight.

26. FIA Special Report: CFTC Discusses High-Frequency Trading, FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N (June 23,
2012), https://fia.org/articles/fia-special-report-cftc-discusses-high-frequency-trading.
27. See Concept Release on Risk Controls, supra note 19, at 56,544 n.7 (stating that “[w]hile the
Commission has no regulatory definition of [automated trading system], the term is generally understood to
mean a computer-driven system that automates the generation and routing of orders to one or more markets.
Other elements of an ATS may also include systems for analyzing market data as a precursor to order
generation, managing orders for conformance with establish risk tolerances, receiving confirmations of orders
placed and trades executed, etc.”).
28. See Algorithmic Trading and Market Dynamics , CME GRP. 1 (July 15, 2010),
https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/Algo_and_HFT_Trading_0610.pdf. “An algorithm simply refers to
any pre-defined step-by-step process used to accomplish a task.” Id.
29. Id.
30. See Designated Contract Markets (DCMS) , CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/Trading
Organizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (defining DCMs as “boards of trade (or exchanges)
that operate under the regulatory oversight of the CFTC, pursuant to Section 5 of the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA)”). “DCMs are most like traditional futures exchanges, which may allow access to their facilities by
all types of traders, including retail customers.” Id.
31. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 8.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 9–10.
34. See Richard Haynes & John S. Roberts, Automated Trading in Futures Markets, CFTC OFFICE OF
CHIEF ECONOMIST 3 (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/
documents/file/oce_automatedtrading.pdf (indicating that almost ninety-five percent of futures trading is
conducted via electronic trading platforms, with the other approximately five percent attributable to either
pit trading or block trading).
35. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 11.
36. Concept Release on Risk Controls, supra note 19, at 56,545.
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A. The Pros and Cons of High-Frequency Automated Trading
With its immense rise in popularity over the past decade, high-frequency
automated trading has generated its fair share of praise and criticism. This section
aims to address these points of view, while ultimately demonstrating that the
practice may be in need of tighter regulation.

1. The Benefits of High-Frequency Automated Trading
Despite some negative connotations, high-frequency automated trading has
undoubtedly contributed to our highly-efficient derivatives market today.37 One of
those benefits is the dramatic reduction in execution times for orders.38 “The
average time required to execute a trade on the major exchanges, which was once
measured in minutes and was still measured in seconds as little as a decade ago,
has fallen to a tiny fraction of a second.”39 What this creates is a market where
investors can be confident that their trades will be executed quickly without
having to worry about price fluctuations before their orders are processed and
finalized.40
Furthermore, a “recent study of low latency activity in the equities market
(typically associated with high frequency trading) concluded that ‘an increase in
low-latency activity reduces quoted spreads and the total price impact of trades,
increases depth in the limit order book, and lowers short-term volatility.’”41 With
the ability of high-frequency traders to analyze data and readjust their orders so
quickly, the broader market benefits from small bid-ask spreads for certain
contracts.42 However, the practice of high-frequency trading has also received its
fair share of criticism recently in response to several isolated incidents 43 and
market events.44

2. The Risks and Drawbacks Associated with High-Frequency Trading
In spite of these legitimate benefits that high-frequency trading provides to
the financial markets, there are serious risks and drawbacks surrounding the
37. See generally Matt Levine, High-Frequency Trading May be Too Efficient, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-04-02/high-frequency-trading-may-be-too-efficient (describing
some of the benefits that high-frequency trading provides to retail and institutional investors alike); see also
Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 13 (weighing the potential risks and benefits of algorithmic
trading).
38. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 549 (crediting the emergence of high-frequency trading with the
dramatic reduction in trade execution time).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 14, citing Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Lowlatency trading, 16 J. FIN. MKT. 646, 648 (2013).
42. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 549–51 (discussing the tendency of high-frequency trading to lower
latency and bid-ask spreads across the financial markets).
43. See Brian Louis & Janan Hanna, Swift Guilty Verdict in Spoofing Trial May Fuel New Prosecutions
in the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-03/commoditiestrader-coscia-found-guilty-in-first-spoofing-trial (recounting the speedy (pun intended) trial of Michael
Coscia, the 53-year-old former head of the high-frequency trading firm Panther Energy Trading LLC, where
he was convicted for violating the anti-spoofing provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act).
44. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 523–24 (recalling the flash crash of May 6, 2010).
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practice that must be taken into account by regulators moving forward. For
instance, many industry insiders believe that high-frequency trading firms are
able to “front-run” (or trade ahead of) the rest of the market due to the speed at
which their computers and algorithms can process trades. 45 In a December 2013
comment letter to the CFTC, Dennis M. Kelleher, President and CEO of the
financial reform organization Better Markets, Inc., wrote:
Suppose a high frequency trader has detected an institutional investor seeking to
transact a large position in small increments. The HFT can discover this by pinging
the market with small test orders at various price levels, immediately cancelling
those orders that are not instantly filled. This technique is akin to using sonar to
locate a whale underwater in order to harpoon it. Having established the presence
of such a large trader, the HFT can position itself ahead of the trade, taking a small
loss at first (to wipe out existing liquidity) before then making a big profit by
flipping its position to the institutional investor.46

Because of the advent of high-frequency automated trading, this type of occurrence
is not uncommon in today’s futures markets.
In addition to front-running, the practice of spoofing has generated a great
deal of attention in the high-frequency trading industry over the past few years.47
Spoofing occurs when a trader “bids or offers with the intent to cancel [that] bid or
offer before execution.”48 Through spoofing, a trader manufactures the illusion of
liquidity in the market by entering bids, orders, or offers.49 These orders are then
visible to other traders for a brief period of time before they are cancelled. 50 This
practice entices large investors into transactions so that high-frequency traders
can flip their positions and ultimately turn a substantial profit. Section 6c(a)(5)(C)
of the Commodity Exchange Act specifically prohibits spoofing in the futures
markets;51 however, the practice still remains a concern of regulators and
investors.
Perhaps more concerning than front-running, spoofing, or other deceptive
or manipulative trading practices is the potential for high-frequency trading to
create extreme volatility and price fluctuations somewhat unexpectedly.
45. See Scopino, supra note 25, at 613–14 (describing how high-frequency traders use lightning-fast
computers and algorithms to entice large institutional investors to enter a transaction in order to learn
nonpublic information).
46. Letter from Dennis Kelleher, President & CEO, Better Markets, Inc., to Melissa Jurgens, Sec’y,
CFTC 3 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at https://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/CFTC-%20CL%20ATS-%2012-11-13.pdf.
47. See Louis, supra note 43 (highlighting the guilty verdict against Michael Coscia for spoofing in the
financial markets in violation of Dodd-Frank).
48. Q & A – Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement on Disruptive Practices , CFTC 2, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/dtpinterpretiveorder_qa.pdf (last visited
Jan. 1, 2017).
49. Scopino, supra note 25, at 650–51.
50. Id.
51. 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5)(C). This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the
rules of a registered entity that—
(A) violates bids or offers;
(B) demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the
closing period; or
(C) is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding or offering with
the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).

Id.
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As mentioned in Part I, there have been two instances of wild fluctuations in
market conditions over the past decade that many believe to be attributable to
high-frequency trading.52 The Flash Crash of May 2010 is believed to have been
caused by “an automated execution algorithm [that] did not take price or time
variables into account. Given the parameters of the program, the algorithm
continued to send orders even as prices moved far beyond traditional daily
ranges.”53 Similarly, the flash crash on August 24, 2015 is believed in large part
to be the result of how high-frequency trading algorithms are structured to trade
when the market is under stress.54
B. Regulation of High-Frequency Automated Trading Thus Far
In response to these practices and market events, the CFTC has undertaken
a project to place tighter regulations on the high-frequency automated trading
industry. In September 2013, the CFTC released its “Concept Release on Risk
Controls and Systems Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments.” 55 This
request for comments was intended to allow the CFTC to best update its
regulations to accommodate for the new technological nature of market structures,
as well as to “ensure that regulatory standards and internal controls are calibrated
to match both current and foreseeable market technologies and risk.” 56 This stood
as the first major step by the CFTC to specifically regulate automated trading.
After generating comments from industry experts and conducting a
tremendous amount of research, on November 24, 2015, the CFTC unanimously
approved Reg. AT.57 “[Reg. AT] represent[s] a series of risk controls, transparency
measures, and other safeguards to enhance the U.S. regulatory regime for
automated trading.”58 The rules were drafted in order to control risk in automated
algorithmic trading activity by enforcing risk control measures (such as provisions
regarding maximum order sizes), by creating development and testing standards
for ATS’s, and requiring registration of certain traders that are currently
unregistered with the Commission.59 These proposed rules have generated a
considerable amount of backlash from entities that engage in automated trading.
Of particular concern to these organizations is proposed section 1.81 of Reg. AT,
which would require all AT persons to maintain a repository of their source code
to be subject to inspection by the CFTC or the Department of Justice without a

52. See Korsmo, supra note 1, at 523–24 (recounting the market events of May 6, 2010, where stock
indexes dramatically tanked and recovered in a matter of only a few minutes); see also Alan Gula, The Flash
Crash of 2015, WALL ST. DAILY (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2015/08/26/stock-marketflash-crash-2015/ (attributing the flash crash of August 24, 2015 in large part to high-frequency trading
practices and their tendency to cause excess volatility in the futures and securities markets).
53. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 52–53.
54. Gula, supra note 52.
55. See generally Concept Release on Risk Controls, supra note 19 (discussing the issues faced by the
CFTC in drafting regulations for automated trading).
56. Id. at 1.
57. See CFTC Unanimously Approves Proposed Rule on Automated Trading, supra note 15
(summarizing the approval of proposed rules to regulate automated trading, known collectively as “Regulation
Automated Trading”).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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subpoena.60 Despite this provision’s potential to help the CFTC enforce rules
violations and reconstruct troublesome market events, this provision has
generated by far the most criticism and outrage from those to whom it applies.
III. Analysis
As it stands, section 1.31 of the Commodity Exchange Act governs the
keeping and inspection of books and records for those under the Act’s
jurisdiction.61 More specifically, it provides that “[a]ll books and records required
to be kept by the Act or by these regulations shall be kept in their original form
(for paper form) or native file format (for electronic records) for a period of five
years from the date thereof and shall be readily accessible during the first two
years of the five-year period[.]”62 In addition, section 1.31(b) provides that:
Persons required to keep books and records by the Act or by these regulations shall
produce such records in a form specified by any representative of the Commission.
Such production shall be made, at the expense of the person required to keep the
book or record, to a Commission representative upon the representative's request.
Instead of furnishing a copy, such person may provide the original book or record
for reproduction, which the representative may temporarily remove from such
person's premises for this purpose. All copies or originals shall be provided
promptly. Upon request, the Commission representative shall issue a receipt
provided by such person for any copy or original book or record received. At the
request of the Commission representative, such person shall, upon the return
thereof, issue a receipt for any copy or original book or record returned by the
representative.63

Pursuant to proposed Reg. AT, these provisions would extend to all “AT Persons,” 64
or anyone that engages in algorithmic automated trading.65
60. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 469; see also Statement of Commissioner J.
Christopher Giancarlo Regarding Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation Automated Trading, CFTC
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostatement112415 (questioning
the CFTC’s inclusion of the source code provision in Regulation AT and expressing particular concern over
whether or not it is necessary or even legal for the CFTC to enforce).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2012).
62. Id. at (a).
63. Id. at (b).
64. See Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 465. The proposed regulations define “AT
Person” to mean:
. . . any person registered or required to be registered as a—
(1) futures commission merchant, floor broker, swap dealer, major swap participant, commodity pool
operator, commodity trading advisor, or introducing broker that engages in Algorithmic Trading on or
subject to the rules of a designated contract market; or
(2) Floor trader as defined in paragraph (x)(3) of this section.

Id.

65. Regulation Automated Trading defines “algorithmic trading” in any commodity interest (as defined
in Commission regulation 1.3(yy)) on or subject to the rules of a DCM, where:
(1) one or more computer algorithms or systems determines whether to initiate, modify, or cancel an
order, or otherwise makes determinations with respect to an order, including but not limited to: the
product to be traded; the venue where the order will be placed; the type of order to be placed; the timing
of the order; whether to place the order; the sequencing of the order in relation to other orders; the price
of the order; the quantity of the order; the partition of the order into smaller components for submission;
the number of orders to be placed; or how to manage the order after submission; and
(2) such order, modification or order cancellation is electronically submitted for processing on or subject
to the rules of a designated contract market; provided, however, that Algorithmic Trading does not
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For the industry, Reg. AT’s proposed rules become problematic at section
1.81, which proposes new or amended “[s]tandards for the development,
monitoring, and compliance of Algorithmic Trading system.” 66 This section, more
specifically, provides that each AT Person:
Maintain[s] a source code repository to manage source access, persistence, copies
of all code used in the production environment, and changes to such code. Such
source code repository must include an audit trail of material changes to source
code that would allow the AT Person to determine, for each such material change:
who made it; when they made it; and the coding purpose of the change. Each AT
Person shall keep such source code repository, and make it available for inspection,
in accordance with § 1.31 [of the Commodity Exchange Act].67

Despite the fact that those who would be subject to proposed Reg. AT object to
many of its provisions, this provision has caught the spotlight. 68 Their objections
arise from the fact that, looking at the existing section 1.31 of the Commodity
Exchange Act alongside proposed section 1.81 of Reg. AT, members of the CFTC
and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) could access the source code of those
engaged in algorithmic automated trading without the use of a subpoena.69
The CFTC stresses that generally, Reg. AT was drafted in order to
effectuate its goal of “reducing risk and increasing transparency in automated
trading.”70 The source code repository provision is, arguably, aligned with that
goal. For instance, with unrestricted access to the source code of algorithmic
traders, the CFTC could better identify and punish those who engage in deceptive
practices such as spoofing and front-running. With direct access to source code,
the CFTC will be better able to infer the requisite intent in order to prosecute
individuals for violations such as spoofing.71 In addition, the source code turnover
provision may allow the CFTC to reconstruct chaotic market events more quickly
than in years’ past—one of its goals in proposing Reg. AT.72
include an order, modification, or order cancellation whose every parameter or attribute is manually
entered into a front-end system by a natural person, with no further discretion by any computer system
or algorithm, prior to its electronic submission for processing on or subject to the rules of a DCM.
(proposed § 1.3(ssss)).

Q & A – Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation Automated Trading (“Regulation AT”), CFTC 3–4 (Nov.

24, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/regat_qa112415.pdf.
66. Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 18, at 468.
67. Id. at 469.
68. See Gregory Meyer, Industry Criticizes CFTC’s Plans For New Automated Trading Rules, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/d6558728-ebba-11e5-9fca-fb0f946fd1f0 (citing to the complaints of
many in the automated trading industry regarding the limit orders that Reg AT proposes, and more
significantly the source code turnover provision); see also Jonathan Watkins, U.S. Automated Trading Rules
Cause Uproar, TRADE (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.thetradenews.com/Regulation/US-automated-tradingrules-cause-uproar/ (stating “perhaps the most controversial aspect of Reg AT is that algorithmic traders’
source code repositories be open to inspection by the CFTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) without a
subpoena”).
69. Compare 17. C.F.R. § 1.31 (outlining the existing recordkeeping and disclosure requirements for
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Act), with Regulation Automated Trading,
supra note 18, at 468 (section 1.81(a)(6) requiring AT Persons to maintain a source code repository in
accordance with section 1.31 of the Commodity Exchange Act).
70. See Q & A – Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 65.
71. Section 4c(a)(5)(C) of the Commodity Exchange Act prohibits “any trading, practice, or conduct . . .
that is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’”.
72. See Q & A – Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 65, at
1–2 (stating “[e]ffective risk controls reduce the potential for market disruptions arising from system
malfunctions and other errors or conduct. The risks of such disruptions are heightened by the interconnection
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However, despite its good intentions, the source code provision of Reg. AT
has received a great deal of opposition and criticism from the industry. Trading
firms that would be subject to Reg. AT are concerned with the CFTC and the DOJ
having access to their source code primarily for two reasons: (1) government
entities, such as the CFTC and the DOJ have not been immune to data breaches,
putting this source code in danger of being stolen by hackers; and (2) it is
unprecedented in any industry to deliver proprietary information to a government
agency without the use of a subpoena.
A. Reg. AT Places Source Code at Risk of Being Stolen Through Potential Data
Breaches
In May 2012, a CFTC employee received a “phishing” email and
unknowingly sent information to what turned out to be a fraudulent website. 73
Because of this action on the part of the employee, a third-party then was able to
infiltrate the employee’s personal account with the CFTC, which stored a great
deal of the Commission’s personnel information.74 According to an email sent to
Commission employees describing the incident, “The email account contained
e-mails and attachments with the names, Social Security numbers and possibly
other sensitive personally identifiable information of certain individuals.”75
Although the CFTC was confident that this breach only affected Commission
employees’ personal information, and not trading or market data,76 incidents such
as this are a reminder that the government is not immune to data breaches and
the possibility of sensitive information falling into the wrong hands.
Furthermore, in its comment letter to the CFTC dated March 16, 2016, the
Futures Industry Association identified two additional recent cyber security
breaches that make the source code provision of Reg. AT troubling.77 The first
breach was with regard to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) in
June 2015.78 “OPM discovered that the background investigation records of
current, former, and prospective federal employees and contractors had been
stolen.”79 OPM and the office responsible for investigating this incident confidently
concluded that as many as 21.5 million individuals’ social security numbers had
been compromised, and that approximately 5.6 million fingerprints had been
stolen as well.80
of markets and increased use of high-speed and algorithmic trading, which makes the implementation of
pre-trade risk controls and other measures even more necessary); see also Meyer, supra note 68 (quoting
CFTC chairman Tim Massad saying, “What we’re interested in is making sure code is preserved, making sure
that if there is a market disruption, we can reconstruct what happened, that there’s audit trail”).
73. See Silla Brush, CFTC Data Breach Risks Employee’s Social Security Numbers , BLOOMBERG (June
24,
2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-25/cftc-data-breach-risks-employees-socialsecurity-numbers (describing how the CFTC, the nation’s preeminent derivatives regulator, put many of its
own employees’ personal information at risk in a data breach in May 2012).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra note 17 (expressing serious concerns about the ability of the
CFTC to ensure that any source code made available to it was safe from the risks of data breaches).
78. Id.; see What Happened OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/
cybersecurity-incidents/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
79. What Happened, supra note 78.
80. Id.
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Looking at the language of Reg. AT, “[i]f source code provided to the CFTC
through an inspection request under section 1.31 was stolen by an unauthorized
third-party, the consequences could be catastrophic to an AT Person.”81 An AT
Person’s source code is extremely valuable, and the result of a significant
investment of both money and technical expertise. In a sense, it is much like a
company’s confidential business plan.82 In addition to providing details about a
firm’s prior trades, it even sheds light on how that firm may plan to trade moving
forward.83 The source code turnover provision (section 1.31) of Reg. AT places firms
in danger of having this information leaked to third parties and potentially
destroying their competitive advantage over other firms.
B. The Surrender of Proprietary Information to Government Agencies Without a
Subpoena is Unprecedented
In addition to creating the possibility that a firm’s source code could be
accidentally leaked to third parties, section 1.31 is, from a broader perspective,
entirely unprecedented action taken by regulators.84 Requiring businesses to turn
over proprietary information such as their source code not only approaches the
line of violating precedent set out by the U.S. Supreme Court, 85 but also comes
close to violating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.86 There are
no other industries where a U.S. regulatory agency has been given such free and
unrestricted access to proprietary information like this.87 Currently, the U.S.
government can only obtain this information with the issuance of a subpoena.88
With regulations as stringent as this, the benefits should certainly outweigh
the costs by a considerable degree. However, many argue that this is not the case;
and, rather, Reg. AT is overly broad and does not justify its intrusiveness. 89
Although having access to this information could allow the CFTC to better
reconstruct market events and monitor traders for illegal activity, the source code
81. FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra note 17, at 53.
82. See Protect Source Code to Protect Innovation in Markets , FIA PRINCIPAL TRADERS GRP. (Apr. 21,
2016, 7:15 p.m.), https://ptg.fia.org/articles/protect-source-code-protect-innovation-markets (likening a firm’s
source code to a business’s “codified business plan”). “[Source code] contains a firm’s strategy and instructions
for how to trade given any number of variables. It is the lifeblood of many firms’ commercial success.
Importantly, it does not just contain information on how a firm may have traded in the past—it details how
the firm will trade in the future.” Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (stating that the source code turnover provision unlike any other action taken by regulatory
agencies).
85. In its comment letter, the FIA cites to the U.S. Supreme Court case of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691 (1987). This case held that inspection schemes of this nature could be conducted absent a warrant only in
the inspection was not unreasonable. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702. Reasonable in this context required that:
1. there must be a “substantial” government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to
which the inspection is made;
2. the warrantless inspection must be “necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme;” and
3. “the statute’s inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its application [must] provide
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.” Id. at 702–03; FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra
note 17, at 46.
86. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
87. FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra note 17, at 48.
88. See Statement of Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo, supra note 60 (expressing concern over
the fact that no other industry (barring perhaps the military or other defense systems) that are forced to allow
the government such unrestricted access to their proprietary information).
89. See Meyer, supra note 68 (pointing to an assertion made by the FIA that the benefits of Reg AT do
not outweigh its potential costs).
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turnover provision is unduly burdensome to justify this possibility. Enforcement
of Reg. AT, as proposed, would likely require AT Persons to increase their internal
compliance costs just in order to make sure that their code repositories are
properly indexed.90 As Commissioner of the CFTC, J. Christopher Giancarlo,
expressed in a public statement following the release of Reg. AT, source code is
extremely valuable information and its release into the wrong hands could prove
detrimental to the U.S. markets.91 Accordingly, it is imperative that the source
code provision in Reg. AT be amended or stricken before its enactment.
IV. An Alternative Regulatory Framework
In its comment letter to the CFTC, the Futures Industry Association
provides a suggestion for alternative methods of regulating the automated trading
industry and gaining access to source code.92 These alternatives focus on the
existing U.S. legal landscape of requiring regulatory agencies to obtain a subpoena
or getting voluntary turnover before obtaining proprietary information such as
source code.93 In such a circumstance, if an AT Person wished to challenge the
validity of the subpoena, that AT Person could request a protective order to ensure
that their valuable source code is protected by the court.94 Alternatively, the
affected AT Person could request additional confidentiality obligations to be
enforced against the CFTC and the DOJ.95 Such protections and confidentiality
requirements could include restricting access to the source code to a limited
number of individuals or computers without an internet connection (to protect
against a data breach), allowing AT Persons to closely supervise the transfer and
dissemination of their source code by regulators, mandating that regulators with
access to source code sign confidentiality agreements prohibiting their release of
the information, or prohibiting regulators from entering the private trading
industry for a specific amount of time after they have had access to source code. 96
Through these suggested safeguards, the CFTC could still achieve its goal of
increasing transparency and fairness in the markets, without infringing too much
on the rights of AT Persons. Accordingly, the CFTC should take into serious
consideration the alternative methods proposed by the Futures Industry
Association.
V. Conclusion
In light of recent trends and market events, the automated trading industry
has come under a great deal of scrutiny from the CFTC. Following the flash
crashes of 2010 and 2015, the Commission was put under tremendous pressure to
90. See FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra note 17, at 54–55 (discussing how source code drastically
differs from other types of information used in audit trails; more specifically, discussing how source code
interacts with other lines of code and how AT Persons would have a difficult time organizing said code for the
CFTC).
91. Statement of Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo, supra note 60.
92. FIA Reg AT Comment Letter, supra note 17, at 53–54.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. (identifying potential alternative approaches to creating a source code repository for the CFTC
which would be less infringing and more protective than section 1.31 currently stands).

Vol. 4, Fall 2016

49

Global Markets Law Journal
enact stricter regulations over this industry, which had previously operated in the
shadows. However, the proposed Reg. AT is overly burdensome and fails to
properly achieve its goal of creating fairness and transparency in the marketplace.
In particular, the source code turnover provision contained in section 1.81 of the
proposed Reg. AT threatens to expose AT Persons’ valuable and proprietary source
code to the possibility of being leaked to third parties, an occurrence which would
be terrible for the U.S. marketplace. For these reasons, the CFTC should amend
proposed section 1.81 of Reg. AT to be less intrusive and more careful to protect
AT Persons’ source code.
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